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China’s rapid economic progress from an impoverished communist state to the world’s 
second largest economy within just three decades has enthralled many economists. That 
the country shifted from the classical centrally-planned command economy to one espousing free 
market practices while maintaining communist rule, has all given rise to this question: What 
exactly is the China model? Is it the hybrid of innovative state ownership and tight political 
control? Or is the rapid growth the result of liberal economic and political reforms? 
From the perspective of Huang Yasheng, there is yet a definitive conclusion to this question. 
However, there are more pressing urgencies that China’s leadership should address rather than 
defining what exactly is the country’s growth model. The double-digit annual growth rates that 
many people have taken for granted is masking the fact the personal income has fallen behind. 
Huang, professor of political economy and international management at Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology’s Sloan School of Management, was speaking at Singapore Management 
University as 2011's Ho Bee Professor in Chinese Economy and Business. Beijing-born Huang, 
who earned his doctorate in government from Harvard University, has also previously taught at 
University of Michigan and his alma mater, Harvard. 
“China’s GDP has been growing for the past three decades, and there is no evidence this is 
changing. But there is a need to go beyond GDP, and GDP here in China, has its own issues,” 
said Huang. 
He feels that at this point in time, GDP should not just be growing via increase in investments 
and exports; rather, GDP growth should be driven more by growth in take home pay and the 
subsequent increase in consumption. “It is important to separate GDP and personal income. 
China succeeded in exporting itself out of previous difficulties – now, I’m not so sure. There is a 
need to rebalance China’s economy,” he said. 
 State enterprises versus Private enterprises 
Besides the tweaks needed between export-led and domestic consumption, China should also 
try to give its private sector companies a leg-up as it is more effective to do so compared to the 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs). For historical reasons under the command economic system, 
China’s economy has been largely dominated by the SOEs, which are the bedrock of society as 
generations of Chinese have grown to rely on the SOEs to provide life-long employment and 
cradle to grave care. 
As China liberalises its economy, SOEs still hog a greater proportion of attention and resources 
at the expense of privately-held enterprises. For example, when the recent global financial crisis 
was happening, the government introduced a stimulus programme where 80 per cent of the bank 
loans made went to SOEs, which employ only 20 per cent of the working population. The private 
companies – with 80 per cent of the working population on their payrolls – received the leftover 
20 per cent of the loans. 
To Huang, this policy is a waste of resources. “By supporting SOEs that don’t create value – that 
doesn’t create wealth. There is absolutely nothing more efficient in creating employment than by 
supporting private enterprises. Many large SOEs are profitable only because they were given 
subsidised financial resources,” said Huang. If SOEs were to take into account the costs of 
capital at the same rates as private companies, up to 90 per cent of the SOE profits would have 
been wiped out, he added. 
 
Wenzhou and India 
Huang is of the view that growth is best led by the private sector. The shiniest example of how 
private sector entrepreneurial zeal, in a climate of reform and liberalisation have led to economic 
success, can be found in the eastern province of Zhejiang, and specifically, the city Wenzhou. 
Wenzhou was in the news recently, as the credit crunch caused some local businessmen to flee 
from their debtors, causing worries that this would mark the start of a wider problem. However, 
from a longer term perspective, there is no denying that Wenzhou, and the province of Zhejiang, 
has been leading in terms of economic and income growth. 
Back in the 1970s, the per capita GDP of Zhejiang was squarely in the middle among the 
country’s provinces. Today, it is the richest province, outranked only by the Beijing, Tianjin and 
Shanghai. These three cities, under China’s political system, are accorded the same status as 
provinces and do not fall under the control of the provinces they are physically located within. 
There are enough big names that began life in Zhejiang to back this claim: e-commerce website 
alibaba.com, beverage giant Wahaha, as well as Wanxiang, a conglomerate with interests in 
automotive parts, agriculture, real estate and infrastructural development. “Zhejiang overtook 
other provinces purely through capitalism, classic market principles,” said Huang. After having 
built their businesses domestically, many of the Wenzhou companies have been on acquisition 
sprees for foreign assets, he added. 
China can also take a leaf out of India: its neighbouring and fellow Asian giant. While India’s 
economic track record thus far cannot be said to be impeccable, there are certain areas where 
India does better than China: developing their private sector. 
Citing a 2009 study done by the Boston Consulting Group, Huang said that out of the top 100 so-
called “Global Challengers”, there were 38 companies from China and 19 Indian companies that 
made it to this list. While India trailed in absolute numbers, most of those that made the cut were 
private companies, while for China, state-owned enterprises figured prominently. 
During the recent global financial crisis, India, unlike China, did not bother with huge stimulus 
programmes to jumpstart its economy. Domestic consumption remained resilient, which kept 
India’s economy going. With or without the crisis, India’s relatively stronger domestic demand 
also means it has a smaller reliance on exports to drive growth – unlike China. “People say that 
China is growing faster than India, but India is investing at only 50 per cent of what China is 
investing, and they are getting 70 per cent of China’s growth. I think India has gotten this right,” 
said Huang. 
 
China's countryside miracle 
Those with shorter memories might think China's rapid developments and big changes only 
happened after the country's ascension into the World Trade Organization in 2001; alleviating 
millions from poverty and elevating China's economic status in the world – what many people 
have referred to as a "Chinese miracle". 
Huang believes that this so-called “Chinese miracle” happened earlier, during the 1980s, not long 
after Deng Xiaoping got both its political economy right and economic reforms going. 
Interestingly, most of the action happened in the rural areas, and lots of entrepreneurial activities 
took place away from the urban areas, including the creation of some of the largest private 
Chinese companies. 
“The miracle started in the countryside,” he said. 
Kelon Group, a leading white goods maker, began at Shunde country of Guangdong province; 
Chery, a leading auto-maker that now owns Volvo, began in Anhui province – a region known 
better for its agriculture and poverty; and agricultural-based conglomerate Hope Group, founded 
by four brothers in Sichuan who gave up their urban homes for a quail egg farm. 
However, back in the 1980s, the country was just recovering from the damaging decade-long 
Cultural Revolution that ended in 1976. How was the climate of change and reform – especially 
in the political sphere – interpreted and received? 
According to Huang, it wasn’t all that difficult. With Deng at the top from 1978 on, the change was 
obvious for all to see. “Deng Xiaoping was purged three times, and reinstated three times – this 
is a well-known fact. His appointment signalled that things have changed, and that he is different 
from Mao Zedong. Even if you are a farmer in Anhui, you also know that politics have changed,” 
he said. 
The change and liberalisation was manifesting in various ways that will surprise China observers 
today unschooled in what happened then. For example, back in 1979, the National People’s 
Congress – typically dismissed as a rubber-stamp equivalent of China’s parliament – held 
hearings where ministers were subject to questionings from the delegates. 
China’s media then was busy exposing corruption – and their targets were not merely on small 
fry village or county party secretaries, but big fishes up to the ministerial level. There was also 
open debate in the media on the pros and cons of policies, and elections were held at villages to 
decide on representation. Even the Communist Party was recruiting capitalists as members, 
although they were known by the euphemism, “individual labourers”, said Huang. 
Furthermore, people were enjoying ownership and control of lots of assets – a reversal of the 
post-1949 nationalisation. Contrast this with the situation today: local authorities from the biggest 
cities to the smallest villages have been aggressively acquiring land and homes on the pretext of 
redevelopment, causing suffering to the rural uneducated, and increasingly, the urban middle 
class. 
More importantly, financial liberalisations also took place in the 1980s. “The reason why it was 
not well-known was because they occurred in rural, not urban China. This can be explained by 
‘observation bias’ – a classical error of many scholars and observers,” said Huang. 
For example, Han Lei, then president of the Agricultural Bank of China said in 1984: “We need to 
allow the existence of private free lending and borrowing.” The use of “private” in this instance 
was especially significant, said Huang, as this word in the context of that era had very negative 
connotations of capitalism and exploitation. Of course, that this was uttered by a senior bank 
official made this all the more interesting. “This was not a minor lunatic running around shouting 
slogans,” said Huang. 
Han was not alone. Chen Muhua, then governor of the People’s Bank of China, the central bank, 
said in 1987 that “the various methods of financial mobilisation have made a true contribution to 
local economic development” – a statement that Huang views as “incredibly market oriented, 
progressive view on the part of the regulator”. 
Private enterprises founded in the countryside had to share some limelight with companies 
founded in the cities during the 1980s that have grown to be world-famous today: Beijing-based 
computer maker Lenovo, and Shenzhen-based telecom equipment maker, Huawei, both of 
whom have found buyers for their products all over the world. 
 The Fifth Generation’s answer 
An entire country’s economy cannot merely rely on a handful of prominent companies. China’s 
dominant avenue of growth via exports thus far is, according to Huang, “extremely abnormal”. 
Once you reach a certain size, most of the growth ought to be driven by personal consumption. 
You are now exporting the surplus and you are subsidising foreign consumers by devaluing your 
currency,” said Huang. 
In a sense, foreign consumers are benefiting at the expense of Chinese workers – and 
increasingly so: income growth is increasingly lagging behind GDP growth. Between 1980 and 
2009, China’s ratio of personal income to per capita GDP has dropped from around 50 per cent 
to 34 per cent. This year, this ratio is likely to drop again. “This number is the lowest of any 
country in any historical period during peacetime,” said Huang. By contrast, American consumers 
have been merrily spending more, with the same ratio in the same period increasing from just 
over 60 per cent to 70 per cent today. 
“Some observers have attributed the relatively low personal consumption to Confucius' value of 
thrift,” said Huang. However, the corresponding ratio for South Korea and Japan is at more than 
50 per cent and 60 per cent respectively. “Last I checked, these two countries are also known as 
countries with Confucius values. Please don’t attribute today’s economic issues to someone from 
2,000 years ago. That doesn’t explain the changes in the consumption versus income ratio. It 
has to be economics and financial policies,”Huang stressed. 
So, if China is to avoid the road to further problems, the gap between personal income and GDP 
per capita must be narrowed. Huang is especially concerned that rural income is lagging further 
and further behind. Yet, China’s economic structure is not doing the rural populace – who still 
outnumber their urban countrymen – much favour. 
“With rural income growth coming down, the opportunity cost of going to Guangdong to seek 
work is low. This has led to a massive incentive to go to Guangdong to work and as we all know 
when supply exceeds demand, wages will be compressed,” said Huang, referring the southern 
coastal Chinese province that is a huge manufacturing base for companies like Foxconn 
(contract manufacturer of the iconic Apple products) and other employers of millions of migrant 
workers from the inland rural areas. 
Just barely two decades ago, per capita GDP and real annual starting wages at Guangdong was 
RMB 2,500 and RMB 5,000 respectively. Per capita GDP caught up with wages in 1995 at RMB 
6,000 each and has since surged ahead. By 2006, per capita GDP, at RMB 27,000, was double 
real annual starting wages. The following year, it surged 18.5 per cent to RMB 32,000 but wages 
could only hit RMB 14,000 – barely 4 per cent from the previous year. It only got worse in 2008, 
when per capita GDP reached RMB 35,000 but real wages, instead of rising, dropped to RMB 
12,000. 
In effect, a huge production base been created, but at the same time, a huge consumption power 
sacrificed: overseas consumers are enjoying savings derived from the low wages of Chinese 
workers. 
The big question, inevitably, is this: how can China close this gap? If personal income growth 
cannot catch up with GDP growth, that will continue to weigh down heavily on personal 
consumption. This is a big question and it needs an equally big answer. “For the government, to 
grow GDP, you can invest in airports, high speed railways and other infrastructural assets, it can 
mobilise all kinds of resources, but, to grow personal income, you require the government to 
effectively reduce its own power,” said Huang. 
He believes that China needs to make changes in areas like pricing of capital, institutional 
reforms in land policies, as well as political reforms. More accountability and less corruption are 
in good order too. 
Is the country’s political leadership, who presumably also recognises the crux of the issue, ready 
for the changes? “The current leadership has done much, but these have so far been merely 
substitutes for reforms; not reforms,” said Huang. 
Referring to Vice President Xi Jinping, whose team of so-called Fifth Generation leaders is slated 
to take over sometime next year, Huang concluded: “Whether or not the next generation of 
leadership will do that -- I have no idea.” 
 
